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The COnDICTIO qUASI InDEbITI
Jacques du Plessis*
1  Introduction
This essay focuses on something called the condictio quasi indebiti. This condictio is 
not well-known in South African law. In fact, it features only twice in the law reports: 
first,	almost	a	century	ago,	in	a	judgment	of	De	Villiers	JP	in	Van Wijk’s trustee v African 
Banking corporation,1 and then, more recently, in a judgment of Harms JA in Bowman, 
de Wet and du Plessis nno v Fidelity Bank Ltd.2 Something this rare may either be so 
precious	that	it	deserves	to	be	saved	from	obscurity,	or	it	may	be	so	insignificant	that	it	
deserves to be consigned to the past. The challenge is then to determine whether there 
is indeed any need for recognising such a condictio in modern South African law. In 
furtherance of a methodology favoured by the Jubilar, the perspective adopted here will 
be historical, taking Roman sources as the point of departure, and then enquiring whether 
these sources provide insights that are useful for modern purposes.
2  Conceptual background: condictio indebiti, quasi indebitum, 
condictio quasi indebiti
It is well-known that in classical Roman law a remedy called the condictio could be 
used	in	a	variety	of	circumstances	to	obtain	restitution	of	a	specific	amount	of	money	
or	a	specific	thing	that	was	transferred	without	legal	ground	(sine causa). In due course, 
certain typical situations when the condictio	 fulfilled	 this	 function	were	 identified.	 In
 
 
1  1912 TPD 44 52-53.
2  1997 (2) SA 35 (A) 41, 45.
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 post-classical Roman law, the condictio was	fragmented	into	four	specific	condictiones 
which related to these typical cases of transfers sine causa.3
The most important of these condictiones was the condictio indebiti. Its distinctive 
elements were traditionally (1) a transfer (datio),	 (2)	 of	 a	 specific	 thing	or	 a	 specific	
amount (certum), (3) which was not due (an indebitum). It is further often said that the 
transfer had to be made in error as to liability. However, it may well be that in classical 
Roman law, as in some modern civilian systems, error as to liability was not a positive 
requirement for the condictio indebiti and that it was rather up to the defendant to raise 
the defence that the undue transfer was made in the knowledge that it was not due.4 
Another of the condictiones which is relevant for present purposes, is the condictio sine 
causa specialis. It functioned as a residual claim, accommodating a variety of cases of 
transfers	without	legal	ground	that	did	not	fit	into	the	established	nominate	claims.5 This 
function of the condictio sine causa specialis is also recognised in modern South African 
law.6
Quasi is often translated with “as if”.7  An indebitum is something which is not due. 
This implies that a quasi indebitum is something which is to be treated as if it is not 
due; something deemed, pretended or theorised to be not due. A condictio quasi indebiti 
could then in turn be a “condictio in respect of a quasi indebitum”, or rendered more 
freely, a “condictio in respect of something which actually is due, but is treated as if it 
were not due”.8 Sometimes, though, the word quasi does not mean “as if”, but rather 
“as” or “since” (als or weil in german).9 When used in this sense in conjunction with 
indebitum, it could mean “as something undue” or “because it is undue”. Quasi then 
actually indicates why the indebitum requirement of the condictio indebiti is met.
Thus far the focus was on quasi in relation to meeting the third requirement for the 
condictio indebiti, namely that of an indebitum. If other requirements of the condictio 
indebiti have not been met, but are deemed to have been met, it would be somewhat odd 
to refer to a condictio quasi indebiti. After all, quasi	 no	 longer	 specifically	 relates	 to	
the indebitum requirement. In these circumstances, quasi rather indicates an analogous 
application of the condictio indebiti. To avoid confusion, one could somewhat inelegantly 
3   See Zimmermann the Law of obligations – Roman Foundations of the civilian tradition (1990) 
834ff.
4   idem 837-838, 848-851, 870-871.
5   idem 854-857, 871-873.
6   See Nortje v Pool NO 1966 (3) SA 96 (A) 134; B & H engineering v First national Bank Ltd 1995 (2) 
SA 279 (A) 284-285.
7   Sv “quasi” in Berger encyclopedic dictionary of Roman Law (1953).
8   See Von Koschembahr-Lyskowski die condictio als Bereicherungsklage im klassischen römischen 
Recht Vol 2 (1907) 161. The term “quasi” was also used in the context of other condictiones (see, eg, 
D 12 4 44 on the condictio causa data causa non secuta, and D 23 3 50pr; D 12 7 2 on the condictio 
sine causa. Cf, too, Von Koschembahr-Lyskowski (supra) 142.
9   See Schwarz die Grundlage der condictio im klassischen römischen Recht (1952) 76, 200-201; also 
see part 3 3 infra on D 19 2 19 6 and part 3 5 infra on D 12 6 26 13. Further see D 12 4 6pr where it is 
said that someone who gives with a view to marriage, which does not take place, can use the condictio 
“as” the expected state of affairs did not materialise (quasi causa non secuta; cf Schwarz supra 76 n 
10).
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have called this remedy a quasi condictio indebiti, but such a concept was unknown to 
the Romans.10
3  Potential fields of application of a condictio quasi indebiti
Against this conceptual background, certain civil-law texts will now be examined. These 
texts deal with a variety of situations where it was not possible to award a condictio 
on the basis that an undue transfer had been made and it had to be determined whether 
restitutionary relief could be awarded on some other, comparable ground.
3.1 The transfer made by a person who was able to effect set-off
According to Digest 16 2 10 1 (Ulpian, Edict, book 63), a condictio is available to 
someone who pays while being able to effect set-off.11 The text deals with set-off in 
the context of venditio bonorum, a mechanism used to execute judgments by selling a 
bankrupt’s estate to a buyer who then undertakes to pay creditors a certain percentage of 
their claims.12 If a creditor is also a debtor of the bankrupt and the purchaser of the estate 
claimed payment from the creditor, then the creditor could demand that the purchaser’s 
claim be reduced to the extent of the bankrupt’s debt. A creditor who was ignorant of this 
right and paid a debt to the bankrupt while failing to exercise this right, was thereupon 
granted a condictio.13 Thus, if A and B owed each other 100, and A paid B 100, A could 
reclaim 100. If this were not the case, B would have retained the 100, and in the event 
of B’s bankruptcy, A would only have had a concurrent claim, which could have been 
worthless, against B.
For	present	purposes,	the	basis	of	the	claim	is	significant.	It	is	said	that	the	creditor	
can reclaim “quasi indebito soluto”, which may be translated with “as if he made a 
payment which was not due”.14 It can be said that the creditor did not really owe the 
transfer because he was entitled to raise the defence that the purchaser’s claim could be 
reduced. This claim was never called a condictio quasi indebiti, though; it was accepted 
that this was an application of the condictio indebiti.15
10   See Von Koschembahr-Lyskowski (n 8) 142, 162.
11   “Si quis igitur compensare potens solverit, condicere poterit quasi indebito soluto.”
12   See Pichonnaz “The retroactive effect of set-off (compensatio) – A journey through Roman law to the 
New Dutch Civil Code” 2000 68(4) The Legal History Review 554-556.
13   See Von Koschembahr-Lyskowski (n 8) 145; Naber “observatiunculae de iure Romano” 1893 (21) 
part xxxII Mnemosyne (Pensatae Pecuniae Condictio Triboniano Restituitur) 48.
14   The Birks translation in Watson (ed) the digest of Justinian Vol 2 at 9 states that he can bring the 
condictio “as if what was not owing has been paid”.
15   D 12 6 30 rules out the condictio indebiti in cases where set-off is not applicable. This implies that the 
condictio indebiti would be available if the transferor could rely on set-off; further see Zimmermann 
comparative Foundations of a european Law of Set-off and Prescription (2002) 38 n 97; Zimmermann 
“Aufrechnung” in Schmoeckel, Rückert & Zimmermann (eds) Historisch-kritischer Kommentar zum 
BGB Vol 2 (2007) 2204ff.
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The approach set out above has by and large been adopted in modern South African 
law in Southern cape Liquors (Pty) Ltd v delipcus Beleggings BK.16 A landlord claimed 
that a tenant was in arrears, cancelled the agreement of lease and claimed damages. 
The tenant then transferred an amount equal to the arrear rental to the landlord, but 
subsequently alleged that at the time when the rental was in arrears, the landlord owed 
the tenant an even larger amount for liquor purchased from it. According to the tenant, 
it was entitled to rely on set-off, and consequently was not in mora or default. Van Zyl J 
held that the tenant did not waive the right to rely on set-off and had a bona fide defence 
against	the	landlord’s	application	for	summary	judgment.	He	then	expressly	confirmed	
that where a transfer is made in ignorance as to the right to rely on set-off, it could be 
reclaimed as an undue transfer with the condictio indebiti.
[I]ndien die skuldenaar sy skuld op ‘n ander wyse sou vereffen, sonder om te besef dat 
hy hom op skuldvergelyking mag beroep, sou hy die betaling wat hy aldus gemaak het 
kon terugvorder as ‘n onverskuldigde betaling. Dit is wat Ulpianus bedoel wanneer hy 
in D 16.2.10.1 sê dat, indien iemand ‘n betaling gemaak het terwyl hy skuldvergelyking 
kon toegepas het, kan hy die betaling met die condictio indebiti terugeis asof dit ‘n 
onverskuldigde betaling was.17
Whether it is indeed desirable, as a matter of policy, for a transferor to be given the 
choice to undo the consequences of his actions in this manner is debatable. Thus, it may 
well be asked why the tenant, who did not invoke set-off at the time when the rental was 
clearly due, should now be able to do so retrospectively.18 But these are matters that have 
to	be	settled	in	the	context	of	the	laws	of	set-off	and	payment	as	modes	of	the	fulfilment	
of	obligations.	They	are	not	primarily	the	concern	of	the	law	of	unjustified	enrichment.	
The point here is that an obligation which has terminated because the conditions for 
the	operation	of	set-off	have	been	fulfilled,	cannot	subsequently	be	performed.19 Such 
a	 transfer	 is	 undue	 from	 the	 perspective	 of	 the	 law	 of	 unjustified	 enrichment	 and	 is	
recoverable with the condictio indebiti.20 There is no need to resort to separate categories 
of enrichment claims such as a condictio quasi indebiti.
16   1998 (4) SA 494 (C).
17   idem at 501. Presumably, the statement only relates to that part of the transfer which need not have 
been transferred had the transferor relied on set-off. Thus, if A owed and paid B 120, and B owed A 
100, it is not clear why A should be entitled to reclaim the full 120. He would have had to pay 20 in 
any event, and to allow him to reclaim it would violate the basic principle that it is not proper to claim 
something which must be returned in any event (dolo facit qui petit quod redditurus est – see D 44 4 
8; D 50 17 173; gerber v Wolson 1955 (1) SA 158 (A) 171E; Ntai v Vereeniging Town Council 1953 
(4) SA 579 (A) 588g-H).
18   See Zimmermann “comparative Foundations” (n 15) 41.
19   Further see the judgment of Van den Heever JA in dickinson Motors (Pty) Ltd v oberholzer 1952 (1) 
SA 443 (A) 451H-452 which contains a rather cryptic reference to D 16 2 10 1, apparently in support 
of a general principle that restitution can be sought by a person who could have raised a defence 
against a claim for payment, but nevertheless paid. As to the possibility of awarding the condictio 
indebiti in that case, see the judgment of Harms JA in Van Reenen Steel (Pty) Ltd v Smith no 2002 (4) 
SA 264 (SCA) para [16].
20   Some systems follow a different approach. After much dispute, the dominant view in modern german 
law is that the transferor who was unaware of the right to effect set-off is not entitled to an enrichment 
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3.2 The transfer made without exercising a right of retention or deduction
We now turn to texts that deal with a problem related to that of set-off, namely a failure 
to withhold part or whole of a performance.21 However, unlike set-off, this right does not 
arise from an entitlement to a counter-performance, but from other sources.
D 30 60 (Julian, Digest, book 39) concerns an heir who incurs expenditures on a 
house subject to a fideicommissum and then delivers it to the estate without making any 
deduction for those expenditures. The fideicommissum presumably also covered some 
funds from which this deduction could have been made.22 A condictio23 is then awarded 
to the heir “as if” he had paid more than was due (quasi plus debito solverit).24 Clearly a 
condictio indebiti could not lie: there was no transfer aimed at discharging a debt.
This text may be contrasted with D 12 6 39 (Marcian, Institutes, book 8): An heir 
(fiduciary),	 in	 terms	 of	 a	 fideicommissum, passed on the inheritance to the ultimate 
beneficiary	(fideicommissary),	but	without	requiring	that	the	fideicommissary	gave	him	
a cautio (essentially an indemnity or security). It is then said that the heir could reclaim 
any amount paid in excess of his liability “quasi indebitum”. This text has been translated 
as “on the theory of payments not owed”.25 Unlike the previous text, however, it is less 
clear whether an analogous application of the condictio indebiti is involved: there is a 
transfer, and it does exceed that which the heir was obliged to transfer. It may then be 
more appropriate to translate quasi with “as”, which means the transferor could reclaim 
the excess “as” something not due, and was in fact awarded a condictio indebiti.26
What, then, is the relevance of these texts from a modern perspective? The answer, in 
short, is not much. As far as reimbursement for unauthorised improvements is concerned, 
Roman law was less developed than modern South African law which essentially equates 
the	fiduciary	to	a	bona fide possessor, and provides him with an enrichment claim for 
certain improvements to the assets under his control.27 There is no need for awarding a 
condictio based on some deemed undue transfer. And from a modern perspective there 
claim;	the	transfer	is	regarded	as	a	valid	act	of	fulfilment	despite	the	existence	of	such	a	right	(see	
Zimmermann “comparative Foundations” (n 15) 38-39 esp n 98; Zimmermann “Aufrechnung” (n 15) 
2204-2205).
21   Apart from the texts below, see further D 19 1 30pr (Africanus, Questions, book 8), which is less 
relevant from a modern perspective, but also illustrates how a deemed overpayment may be reclaimed 
with a condictio; the remedy has been called a condictio quasi plus debito solvere, or, more simply, 
a condictio quasi indebiti (see Farner Logik der Kommunikation, Rationalität des Rechts, Kalkül der 
macht (2008) 75).
22   Von Koschembahr-Lyskowski die condictio als Bereicherungsklage im klassischen römischen Recht 
Vol 1 (1903) 98.
23   As to the dispute whether the condictio related to the cost of the repairs or to the return of the house 
itself, see Von Koschembahr-Lyskowski Vol 1 (n 22) 99 and Vol 2 (n 8) 221ff; Von Mayr Die Condictio 
des römischen Privatrechtes (1900) 186.
24   Further Francke Civilistische Abhandlungen (1826) Zweite Abhandlung 92-93.
25   The translation is by Birks in Watson (ed) the digest of Justinian Vol 1 (rev ed 1998).
26   See part 2 supra on the various meanings of “quasi”.
27   Voet commentarius ad Pandectas (Paris, 1829) 36 1 61; Ex parte van Zyl 1948 (2) SA 210 (C) 213-
214; the enrichment claim is secured by a right of retention.
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can be no objection in principle to awarding a condictio indebiti if more was transferred 
to an heir than he was entitled to. Matters are somewhat more complicated, though, when 
creditors with valid claims against estates are paid contrary to the rules governing the 
distribution of the assets. To this point we return later.28
3.3		 The	transfer	made	in	fulfilment	of	a	contract	that	had	terminated	due	
to supervening impossibility or frustration
A tenant rents a property for a year and pays the full rental in advance. After six months, 
the premises are destroyed. The tenant now seeks repayment of the rental for the 
remaining period. According to D 19 2 19 6 (Ulpian, Edict, book 32)29 the tenant should 
reclaim payment for the remaining period with an action on hire (actio conducti).30 Ulpian 
expressly rejects the possibility of awarding a condictio “as if” (or perhaps “as”) the 
money was not owed” (quasi indebitum).31 The reason provided is that an overpayment 
was not made by mistake as to liability,32 but to gain an advantage in concluding the 
hire.33 It would have been quite different, he adds, if a tenant would have hired for ten 
but	paid	fifteen	–	then	the condictio could be used, “for there is considerable difference 
between a person paying by mistake and one who prepays his entire rental payment”.
From a modern perspective, it is notable that the text only regards a contractual claim 
as an alternative to the condictio indebiti. No other condictio is considered – not even 
a condictio on the basis that a transfer was made under a valid legal ground which then 
subsequently	 fell	 away.	This	 is	 the	 traditional	field	of	application	of	 the	condictio ob 
causam finitam which falls under the condictio sine causa specialis. In modern South 
African	 law,	 one	 of	 the	fields	 of	 application	 of	 this	condictio is indeed to obtain the 
restitution	of	transfers	made	in	fulfilment	of	a	contract	that	terminated	due	to	supervening	
impossibility.34 This enrichment claim is distinct from the condictio indebiti as well as 
28   See infra at part 3 6.
29   See Zimmermann (n 3) 347; Rainer & Filip-Fröschl texte zum Römischen Recht (1998) 197-198. 
On the disputes as to the integrity of the text see Schwarz (n 9) 76; Litewski “Die Zahlung bei der 
Sachmiete (Vor oder nach Ablauf der Mietzeit) im Römischen Recht” 2002 (70) The Legal History 
Review 229, 242.
30   According to Von Mayr (n 23) at 346 the reason for awarding a contractual claim is that this type of 
eventuality is to be expected within the contractual domain. His argument that the contract could be 
rescinded in the event of a mistaken payment is not convincing.
31   The context is not conclusive. Frier in Watson (ed) the digest of Justinian Vol 2 translates “quasi” 
as “on the theory that the money was not owed”, which is similar to “as if the money was not owed”, 
while Schwarz (n 9) 75-76, esp n 10 favours the more direct translation of “quasi” with “as” (als) as 
opposed to “as if”; as to these differences, see part 2 supra.
32   It is rather fanciful to regard the tenant who paid in advance as being mistaken in the sense that he 
failed to contemplate the possibility of destruction of the premises prior to the expiry of the lease (see 
Schwarz’s criticism at (n 9) 75 of Solazzi L’errore nella condictio indebiti Vol 1 (1939) 38).
33 	 	 The	advantage	of	paying	up-front	is	presumably	to	ensure	or	“secure”	that	he	enjoys	the	benefits	of	the	
lease (see Litewski (n 29) 229, 248).
34   See Voet (n 27) 12 7 1; Hughes v Levy 1907 TS 276; Wiley NO v mundinch and Co (1902) 19 SC 
447 452; Holtshausen v minnaar (1905) 10 HCg 50; further cf Kudu granite Operations (Pty) Ltd v 
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from any contractual remedy aimed at restitution. Again, therefore, no need exists for 
introducing a condictio quasi indebiti.
3.4		 The	transfer	made	in	fulfilment	of	a	gambling	agreement
Roman law strongly disapproved of gambling. Digest 11 5 4 (Paul, Edict, book 19) deals 
with remedies aimed at undoing the consequences of contravening these restrictions in 
the context of gambling by a slave or a son-in-power. Mention is then made in Digest 
11 5 4 2 of an actio utilis that could be directed by the losing party against patrons and 
parents to recover gambling losses.35 Although the remedy is clearly not a condictio, the 
sixteenth-century humanist Cujacius in a  comment on this text refers to a “condictio, 
quasi indebiti”.36 The argument apparently is that even though the transfer of the losing 
party	was	made	in	fulfilment	of	an	agreement,	it	should	be	regarded	as	if	it	was	not	due.
Again,	however,	we	find	that	subsequent	developments	have	undermined	any	need	
for resorting to the notion that a condictio should be awarded in respect of a quasi 
indebitum. In Roman-Dutch law, gambling was viewed with less disapproval37 although 
there was still some support for allowing losing parties rights of restitution.38 To the 
extent that gambling is not in any event legalised by statute,39 the South African common 
law	generally	accepts	that	transfers	made	in	fulfilment	of	gambling	agreements	cannot	be	
reclaimed. Although gambling agreements do not give rise to typical natural obligations,40 
there is no scope for the application of an enrichment action to reclaim gambling losses 
– especially not the condictio ob turpem vel iniustam causam, which traditionally applies 
in the context of illegal transactions, and is tempered by the in pari delicto rule, which 
generally excludes a claim when both parties’ conduct is tainted by turpitude. In these 
circumstances there is also no place for a condictio quasi indebiti aimed at ensuring 
restitution to the losing party on the basis that it is “as if” a transfer was not due.
Caterna Ltd 2003 (5) SA 193 (SCA) 201-202.
35   The losing party who was granted the actio utilis was presumably a son or liberated slave who incurred 
losses in gambling with a parent or patron (see glück Pandekten Vol 2 Book 5 Tit para 758 at 333).
36   Paratit. c. de Aleatoribus: “Et est non leve crimen si quis vetita luserit alea, cujus odio multa 
singulariter recepta sunt: ut condictio, quasi indebiti competat ei qui victus alea sciens ultro solvit, id 
quod in alea amisit” (= cujacii operarum – tomus Secundus (1722) 185). For comment see Cour de 
cassation – Audience de Rentreé du 4 novembre 1861 – discours Prononcé par M A Blanche, Avocat 
Général, de La Loi commerciale (Paris, 1861), 40; his version of the Cujacius text is not identical to 
the one quoted above; for example, it contains no comma between “condictio” and “quasi indebiti”.
37   See gane “The Roman-Dutch law in relation to gambling and wagering” 1906 SALJ 21 25ff.
38   See Dovring, Fischer & Meijers (eds) Grotius. inleidinge tot de Hollandsche Rechtsgeleerdheid 3 3 
48-49 (1965).
39   The National gambling Act 7 of 2004 regulates the consequences of certain gambling activities; s 16 
specifically	deals	with	the	enforceability	of	gambling	debts.
40   See gibson v van der Walt 1952 (1) SA 262 (A) 267-268.
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3.5		 The	transfer	that	only	partially	fulfils	an	alternative	obligation
According to Digest 12 6 26 13 (Ulpian, Edict, book 26), if a person is obliged either 
to pay an amount of money or to deliver a thing and then pays part of the money, only 
to deliver the thing later on, the partial payment may be recovered “quasi indebita”. 
Where quasi means “as if”, the words quasi indebita then imply that the payment is due 
but must be treated “as if” it is not due or deemed to be not due. It is not clear from the 
context, though, why it is necessary to deem the payment to be undue. If the obligation 
is either to pay in full or to transfer an object, partial payment gives rise to a state of 
uncertainty as to whether the transfer is due or not; it cannot then be decided whether 
or not the transfer is sine causa. However, once the object is transferred, the uncertainty 
is	over.	It	is	then	established	that	the	payment	cannot	serve	to	fulfil	an	obligation.	The	
transfer can thereupon be reclaimed “as something not due” or “on the basis that it is not 
due”.41 The appropriate remedy is then indeed the condictio indebiti.
This interpretation also accords with the related example which Pothier, in a 
discussion of the condictio indebiti, provides of a debtor “in our colonies” who was 
obliged	to	pay	ten	crowns	or	deliver	the	slave	Jacques,	and	then	initially	only	paid	five	
crowns.	If	the	debtor	subsequently	paid	the	remaining	five	crowns,	the	payment	of	the	
first	five	crowns	would	turn	out	to	be	due;	but	if	 the	slave	Jacques	was	delivered,	the	
initial	payment	of	five	crowns	would	turn	out	not	to	be	due	and	would	be	recoverable	
with the condictio indebiti.42
In modern South African law, a transferor who has exercised the choice to pay rather 
than deliver the object, and then paid in part, would not be able to change his mind 
and subsequently deliver the object. The partial transfer would be due and cannot be 
reclaimed.	 The	 recipient	 would	 be	 entitled	 to	 specific	 performance	 of	 the	 obligation	
to pay the balance.43 However, as indicated above, if the transferor has made a partial 
payment	without	exercising	a	final	choice,	 the	position	 remains	 in	abeyance	until	 the	
choice is made. It is too early to determine whether restitution should be awarded. If the 
choice ultimately is rather to transfer the object, it would simultaneously be established 
that the partial payment is not due. The appropriate claim with which to reclaim the 
partial payment would be the condictio indebiti. There is no need to award a condictio on 
the basis that such a payment should be deemed not to be due.
41   See part 2 supra on “quasi” being translated with “as”.
42   Hosten (ed) and Hosten & Van Soelen (trls) treatise on the quasi-contract called Promutuum and on 
the Condictio Indebiti (1987) para 155). See D 46 3 34. Further see Licences and general Insurance 
co v ismay 1951 (2) SA 456 (E) 461F-462D on the position where a promise is given to pay an amount 
to one person or to transfer a thing to another and the former receives full payment, but the latter is 
also given a share in the thing. The principle is apparently that if the party who received the share only 
did this on behalf of the party who received full payment, the condictio indebiti can be raised against 
the latter. It is then said to be “as if” he made an undue payment at the latter’s behest.
43   On the operation of alternative obligations see dryland Farms (Pty) Ltd v Botha 1969 (2) SA 617 
(gW) 621.
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3.6 The ultra vires transfer made by a person acting in a representative 
capacity
Thus far, the focus was primarily on Roman texts. We now turn to the two South African 
cases that refer to a condictio quasi indebiti. Both deal with ultra vires transfers made by 
persons acting in a representative capacity.
In Van Wijk’s trustee v African Banking corporation44 an executor improperly paid a 
creditor whose claim should have been postponed instead of paying a preferent creditor. 
The	 assets	 of	 the	 estate	were	 not	 sufficient	 to	meet	 the	 liabilities.	The	 question	 then	
arose whether the executor should be entitled to seek restitution of the overpayment. 
According to De Villiers JP, the payment of a debt by the executor was “in the nature of a 
quasi indebitum”, and “the estate, through the executor or trustee, [should be] given the 
right to recover what has been improperly paid by way of a condictio quasi indebiti”.45 
But why quasi indebiti? There appears to be two possible motivations. One is a concern 
with whether the transfer may be regarded as undue when it was in fact due from the 
perspective of the recipient who had a valid claim against the estate.46 The other is with 
whether restitution may be sought by the person who paid in a representative capacity, 
as opposed to the persons whom he represents.47	It	will	be	noted	that	especially	the	first	
of these concerns tie in with some of the Roman texts examined earlier, which likewise 
relate to transfers that could be regarded as due from the perspective of the recipient but 
somehow	still	did	not	result	in	valid	fulfilment.48
However, the seeds of the condictio quasi indebiti which De Villiers JP sowed in the 
Van Wijk case did not fall on fertile ground. In due course, the right of the executor in 
office	to	recover	incorrect	distributions	became	entrenched	in	a	statute,49 and in related 
situations not covered by statute, the courts awarded other remedies. Thus, in C C A 
Little & Sons v Liquidator R cumming (Pvt) Ltd (in Liquidation),50 it was held that the 
condictio sine causa was the appropriate remedy to reclaim a payment which a judicial 
manager had made to a creditor with a valid claim but which unlawfully preferred 
one pre-judicial management creditor over another.51 The possible application of the 
condictio indebiti was excluded on the ground that an obligation was validly owed.52 The 
purpose of awarding the condictio sine causa was then to ensure restitution even though 
the transfer was due, on the basis that it was unlawful or prohibited by law.53
44  1912 TPD 44 52-53.
45   Ibid.
46   idem 51.
47   idem 52-53.
48   See, eg, D 16 2 10 1 (the bankrupt had a valid claim for payment); D 19 1 30pr (the purchaser was 
entitled to delivery of the slave); D	12	6	39	(the	fideicommissary	was	entitled	to	the	inheritance).
49   S 50(b) of the Administration of Estates Act 66 of 1965.
50   1964 (2) SA 684 (SR).
51   idem 691A-C.
52   idem 691B.
53   idem 691B-C, inter alia relying on Voet (n 27) 12 7 2 which recognises that the condictio sine causa is 
awarded when “something is given for a cause which has indeed in truth an existence, but is yet ipso 
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This application of the condictio sine causa was endorsed in Rulten NO v Herald 
Industries (Pty) Ltd,54 where a trustee of an insolvent estate overpaid a creditor by 
wrongly treating the claim as preferent. One reason for awarding this condictio55 was 
essentially that any causa that may have existed at the time of transfer fell away once 
the dividend was determined. The other reason, which relates to the ground advanced 
in Little above for awarding the condictio sine causa, was that the transfer exceeded the 
lawful authority of the trustee or was ultra vires. However, unlike in Little, the court 
in Rulten was also willing to award the condictio indebiti, essentially on the basis that 
a trustee who lacked authority could not effect a valid payment to the creditor.56 The 
transfer	therefore	failed	to	fulfil	an	obligation.	Ultimately,	these	cases	reveal	two	possible	
bases for awarding restitution: either the transfer is due or owed to the creditor, but is still 
recoverable because it is prohibited or ultra vires (the claim is then the condictio sine 
causa); or the transfer is not due or owed to the creditor because he is only entitled to 
what he can receive lawfully from a person with the capacity to transfer to him (hence 
the condictio indebiti). No need then exists to deem a transfer to be undue or to resort to 
the notion of a quasi indebitum.
The story of the condictio quasi indebiti could have ended here, but it did not. One 
would perhaps have been forgiven for believing that the condictio quasi indebiti no 
longer formed part of South African law at the end of the twentieth century. However, in 
Bowman, de Wet and du Plessis nno v Fidelity Bank Ltd,57 a case which concerned the 
related question of the recoverability of ultra vires payments by liquidators, Harms JA 
returned to the Van Wijk judgment and its reference to the condictio quasi indebiti. He 
commented as follows:
[In Watson’s Executor v Watson’s Heirs (1891) 8 SC 283] De Villiers CJ found (at 286) 
that, in an action by executors qua executors against heirs for recovery of their inheritance, 
the only question was whether the amount claimed was then due. Error in payment of the 
inheritance was not required for a successful claim and the absence of any reference 
to excusability had to follow as a matter of course. It is therefore understandable why 
this action has been referred to as a condictio quasi indebiti in Van Wijk. Once that is 
understood, it is unnecessary to introduce the complication of the condictio sine causa as 
was done in, for instance, Little and Rulten.58
For present purposes it is crucial that the reason provided for referring to the claim as 
a condictio quasi indebiti is not that there is a deviation from the requirement that an 
indebitum must be transferred. The reason is said to be that another requirement of the 
condictio indebiti, namely an (excusable) error as to liability, had not been met.
jure null” (gane (trl) The Selective Voet Vol 2 (1955) 860).
54   1982 (3) SA 600 (D). See Carey Miller “Condictio indebiti: Overpayment by a trustee on insolvency” 
1983 SALJ 183.
55   1982 (3) SA 600 (D) 610F-g.
56   idem 610D-E.
57  1997 (2) SA 35 (A) 41 45.
58   idem 45D-F.
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The notion that the term condictio quasi indebiti could be used to describe what 
essentially amounts to an “errorless” condictio indebiti is unfortunately not free from 
difficulties.	First,	 in	dealing	with	 the	condictio quasi indebiti, the Van Wijk judgment 
reflected	no	discernible	 interest	 in	whether	error	should	be	required	 in	 reclaiming	 the	
transfer. As indicated earlier, the reference to quasi indebitum should rather be viewed in 
the context of a concern with whether a transfer may be regarded as undue if it was due 
from the perspective of the recipient, and with whether restitution may be sought by a 
person who pays in a representative capacity.59 As we have seen, it is also in contexts like 
these that the concept of the quasi indebitum features in the civilian tradition.
This brings us to the second problem. In the light of these concerns, the possible 
application of the condictio sine causa in these circumstances should perhaps not be 
discounted so easily as Harms JA suggests. As we have seen, there are two possible 
reasons for awarding restitution in these situations: the one is that a transfer is not owed 
to the recipient to the extent that it exceeds that which the representative can validly 
transfer in the scope of his authority (the domain of the condictio indebiti); and the other 
is that a transfer is owed to the recipient, but is not supported by a legal ground due to 
the lack of authority (the domain of the condictio sine causa).	It	would	have	simplified	
matters had the Rulten case exercised a clear choice between them. But there appears to 
be	no	discernible	benefit	associated	with	further	introducing	the	concept	of	the	condictio 
quasi indebiti to describe the claim for restitution in the absence of proof of an error.
Finally, the dictum is problematic inasmuch as it suggests that error is a core feature 
of the condictio indebiti proper. As Harms JA himself acknowledged, the requirements of 
the condictio indebiti may be deviated from and it could be applied analogously in new 
situations.60 It is generally accepted that there are other cases where the condictio indebiti 
is awarded without proof of error, but without any need being felt to describe the claim 
as a condictio quasi indebiti. Thus, if an undue transfer is made under duress and protest, 
the relevant claim is the condictio indebiti and not a condictio quasi indebiti.61
4  Conclusions
It does not appear, from a historical perspective at least, that it would be advantageous 
to recognise an enrichment claim styled the condictio quasi indebiti to accommodate 
cases where the requirements of the classic claim for restitution of undue transfers, 
the condictio indebiti, have not been met. In certain rare cases, Roman law admittedly 
allowed restitution of a transfer by deeming it not to be due or regarding it as a quasi 
indebitum.	However,	from	the	perspective	of	the	modern	South	African	law	of	unjustified	
enrichment, these instances generally involve transfers that are actually undue and hence 
may be brought home under the condictio indebiti, or that are already accommodated 
59   idem 52-53.
60   See Bowman, de Wet and du Plessis no v Fidelity Bank Ltd 1997 (2) SA 35 (A) 39J - 40A-B (per 
Harms JA); Kommissaris van Binnelandse inkomste v Willers 1994 (3) SA 283 (A), especially 333g-
H; Alphina investments Ltd v Blacher 2008 (5) SA 479 (C) par 21.
61   See commissioner of inland Revenue v First national industrial Bank Ltd 1990 (3) SA 641 (A).
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under other claims: most notably the condictio sine causa (specialis), which traditionally 
is the residual category accommodating transfers made without legal ground. Finally, 
to refer to a condictio quasi indebiti in situations where an undue transfer is not made 
in error may not only invite confusion with cases where there is a problem with the 
requirement that the transfer must be undue or an indebitum, but also lacks any clear 
basis in the civilian tradition.
